Abstract
Antidumping is by far the most prevalent instrument for imposing new import restrictions. In the 1980s antidumping was used almost exclusively by a handful of industrial countries. More recently its use by developing countries has burgeoned. Since the WTO Agreements went into effect in 1995, developing countries have initiated 559 cases, developed countries 463 (through June 2000). Per dollar of imports, ten developing countries have initiated at least five times more antidumping cases than the United States. Even so, the WTO community continues to take up antidumping as if it were a specialized instrument. In reality its scope under present WTO rules allows it to be applied against any instance of politically troubling imports.
As a "pressure valve" to help maintain an open trade policy, antidumping has serious weaknesses: (1) its technical strictures do not distinguish between instances that advance rather than harm the national economic interest; (2) its politics of branding foreigners as unfair strengthens rather than mutes pressures against liberalization.
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Political reality suggests that any government that attempts to establish or maintain an open import regime must have at hand some sort of pressure valve -some process to manage occasional pressures for exceptional or sector-specific protection. Since the 1980s antidumping has served this function. An antidumping petition is the usual way in which an industry, beset by troublesome imports, will request protection -to say the same thing from the other side, an antidumping investigation is the usual way that the government will consider a request for protection.
We will, in this paper, treat antidumping from the general safeguard perspective. We begin with a discussion of how the safeguard instrument has evolved in the GATT/WTO system -through the post Uruguay Round period in which antidumping has become the most commonly used instrument of import politics for developing countries, as well as developed. Looking at the record of antidumping cases since the Uruguay Round we demonstrate, for example, that the developing countries now use the instrument even more intensely than the traditional users: Australia, Canada, the European Community and the United States. We then review the usefulness of antidumping as a general safeguard instrument and provide some suggestions on the characteristics of a more sensible safeguard instrument -one which provides a means for a government to manage pressures for protection in a way that (a) helps it to reach economically sensible answers as to when to impose new protection, and (b) supports rather than undercuts the politics of openness. We conclude that antidumping does not serve this function well.
GATT EXPERIENCE
While the GATT is best known as an agreement to remove trade restrictions, it includes a number of provisions that allow countries to impose new ones. Among them, Article VI allows antidumping and countervailing duties, Article XVIII allows restrictions to defend the balance of payments or to promote industry development, and Article XX lists ten broad categories, e.g., restrictions necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
Renegotiation
As reciprocal negotiation was the initial GATT mode for removing trade restrictions, it is no surprise that renegotiation was the most prominent provision for reimposing them. The 1947 agreement gave each country an automatic right to renegotiate any of its reductions after three years (Article XXVIII), and under "sympathetic consideration" procedures, reductions could be renegotiated more quickly. Even quicker adjustment was possible under Article XIX. In instances of particularly troublesome increases of imports, a country could introduce a new restriction then afterwards negotiate a compensating agreement with its trading partners.
2 The idea of compensation was the same here as with a renegotiation, to provide on some other product a reduction that suppliers considered equally valuable.
In the 1950s the GATT was amended to add more elaborate renegotiation provisions. Though the details were complex, the renegotiation process, in outline, was straightforward. 1. A country for which import of some product had become particularly troublesome would advise the GATT and the principal exporters of that product that it wanted to renegotiate its previous tariff reduction. 2. If, after a certain number of days, negotiation had not reached agreement, the country could go ahead and increase the tariff. 3. If the initiating country did so, and at the same time did not provide compensation that exporters considered satisfactory, then the principal exporters were free to retaliate. 4. All of these actions were subject to the most favored nations principle; the tariff reductions or increases had to apply to imports from all countries.
3
Emergency actions
Article XIX, titled "Emergency Actions on Imports of Particular Products," but often referred to as the escape clause or the safeguard clause, provided a country with an import problem quicker access to essentially the same process. Under Article XIX: 1. If imports cause or threaten serious injury 4 to domestic producers, the country could take emergency action to restrict those imports. 5. If subsequent consultation with exporters did not lead to satisfactory compensation, then the exporters could retaliate.
The GATT asked the country taking emergency action to consult with exporting countries before, but allowed the action to come first in "critical circumstances." In practice, the action has come first most of the time.
5
History shows that during GATT's first decade and a half, countries opening their economies to international competition through the GATT negotiations did avail themselves of pressure valve actions (Chart 1). These actions were in large part renegotiations under Article XXVIII, supplemented by emergency actions (restrict first, then negotiate compensation) under the procedures of Article XIX.
6 Over time, the mix shifted toward a larger proportion of emergency actions.
By 1963, fifteen years after the GATT first came into effect, every one of the 29 GATT member countries who had bound tariff reductions under the GATT had undertaken at least one renegotiation -in total, 110 renegotiations, or almost four per country.
In use, Article XIX emergency actions and Article XXVIII renegotiations complemented each together. Nine of the 15 pre-1962 Article XIX actions that were large enough that the exporter insisted on compensation (or threatened retaliation) were eventually resolved as Article XXVIII renegotiations. Article XXVIII renegotiations, in turn, were often folded into regular tariff negotiations. From 1947 through 1961, five negotiating rounds were completed; hence such negotiations were almost continuously under way.
Negotiated Export Restraints
By the 1960s formal use of Article XIX and of the renegotiations process began to wane. Actions taken under the escape clause tended to involve negligible amounts of world trade in relatively minor product categories.
7 Big problems such as textile and apparel imports were handled another way, through the negotiation of "voluntary" export restraint agreements, VERs. The various textile agreements beginning in 1962, provided GATT sanction to VERs on textiles and apparel. The same method, negotiated export restraints, or VERs, were used by the developed countries to control troublesome imports into several other important sectors, e.g., steel in the US, autos in the EU.
Except for those specially sanctioned by the textile arrangements, VERs were clearly GATT-illegal. 8 However, while VERs violated GATT legalisms they accorded well with its ethic of reciprocity:
• They were at least in form, negotiations to allow replacement of restrictions that had been negotiated down. Negotiation was also important to prevent a chain reaction of one country following another to restrict its imports as had occurred in the 1930s.
• A VER did provide compensation, the compensation being the higher price that the exporter would receive.
• In many instances the troublesome increase of imports came from countries that had not been the "principal suppliers" with whom the initial concession had been negotiated. These new exporters were displacing not only domestic production in importing countries, but the exports of the traditional suppliers as well. A VER with the new, troublesome, supplier could thus be viewed as defense of the rights of the principal suppliers who had paid for the initial concession.
• The reality of power politics was another factor. Even though one of GATT's objectives was to neutralize the influence of economic power on the determination of trade policy, VERs were frequently used by large countries to control imports from smaller countries.
As the renegotiation, emergency action mechanism was replaced over time by the use of VERs, VERs also gave way to another mechanism -antidumping. There were several reasons behind this evolution:
• the growing realization in developed countries that a VER was a costly form of protection, 9
• the long term legal pressure of the GATT rules,
• the availability of an attractive, GATT-legal, alternative.
The Uruguay Round agreement on safeguards explicitly bans further use of VERs and, along with the agreement on textiles and clothing, requires the elimination of all such measures now in place.
Antidumping
Antidumping was a minor instrument when GATT was negotiated, and provision for antidumping regulations was included with little controversy. In 1958, when the contracting parties finally canvassed themselves about the use of antidumping, the resulting tally showed only 37 antidumping decrees in force across all GATT member countries, 21 of these in South Africa. (GATT 1958, p. 14) By the 1990s antidumping had become the developed countries' major safeguard instrument. Since the WTO Agreements went into effect in 1995, it has gained increasing popularity among developing countries. The scale of use of antidumping is a magnitude larger than the scale of use of renegotiations and emergency actions have ever been. (Chart 2)
Once antidumping proved itself to be applicable to any case of troublesome imports, its other attractions for protection seeking industries and for governments inclined to provide protection were apparent: 10 9 For example, Hufbauer and Elliott found that of the welfare loss placed on the US economy from all forms of protection in place in the early 1990s, over 83 percent of that loss came from VERs. 10 The process by which the scope of antidumping was expanded is examined in ch. 2.
! Particular exporters could be picked out. GATT/WTO does not require multilateral application. ! The action is unilateral. GATT/WTO rules require no compensation or renegotiation.
! In national practice, the injury test for antidumping action tends to be softer than the injury test for action under Article XIX. ! The rhetoric of foreign unfairness provides a vehicle for building a political case for protection. ! Antidumping and VERs have proved to be effective complements; i.e., the threat of formal action under the antidumping law provides leverage to force an exporter to accept a VER. ! The investigation process itself tends to curb imports. This is because exporters bear significant legal and administrative costs and importers face the uncertainty of having to pay backdated antidumping duties, once an investigation is completed. ! There is no rule against double jeopardy. If one petition against an exporter fails, minor respecification generates a new valid petition.
POST URUGUAY ROUND USE OF ANTIDUMPING
This section provides a brief factual presentation of which economies are the most frequent perpetrators of antidumping cases and which economies the most frequent victims. It begins with no hypothesis, its purpose is more to raise questions than to answer them.
Perpetrators
Since the WTO Agreements went into effect in 1995, more than 50 developing countries have informed the WTO of their antidumping regulations, 28 have notified the initiation of antidumping cases. Chart 3 plots the number of antidumping initiations by developed and by developing countries over the past 15 years. Developing countries since the Uruguay Round (in 1995-99) have initiated 559 cases, developed countries 463 cases. (Table 1 ) Even transition economies have entered with 4 cases by Poland, 2 by the Czech Republic and 1 by Slovenia.
The EU and the US have initiated by far the largest numbers of cases. These economies are, however, the world's largest importers. Hence we provide, in Table 2 , two measures of frequency of use of antidumping: the number of cases initiated, and the number of cases per dollar of imports.
The latter measure we present as an index. As the US is the country most associated with antidumping, we set the index of antidumping cases per dollar of imports to 100 for the US and scale other values from there.
By cases per dollar of imports, the US has been among the users of antidumping, one of the least intense users. Countries such as Japan that have never initiated an antidumping case are the least intense users.
Perhaps the most worrisome information in Table 2 is that the most intense users of antidumping are developing countries. South Africa, 89 cases; Argentina, 89 cases; India, 83 cases; and Brazil, 56 cases are high on the list by simple number of cases. By the alternate measure, Brazil's intensity of use is five times the US intensity -India's seven times, South Africa and Argentina's twenty times the US figure. Per dollar of imports, the US is not a high user of antidumping. Each of the other developed country users (Table 2) is above the US. Moreover, the number of cases per dollar of imports is lower for the US than for all developed countries combined, including non-users such as Japan. Table 4 provides summary information about which countries are most often the victim of antidumping cases. Table 5 provides country-by-country information, not only the number of antidumping cases against each country, but also a measure of how many cases against a country per dollar of exports. The measure of how intensely a country's exports are targeted by foreign antidumping cases is scaled to the figure for Japan.
Victims
Perhaps the most striking finding in Table 5 is that the transition economies are the ones with the highest intensity of antidumping cases against them. Table 6 focuses on the relative intensity of initiations against different groups of countries. Transition economy exporters are the most intensely targeted, developed economy the least intensely. As compared to developed economy exporters, developing economy exporters (including Chinese) are almost three times more intensely targeted.
Developing economy antidumping enforcement is as much aimed at developing economy exporters as is developed economy enforcement. Developing economy exporters do not get a break from developing economy antidumping authorities. Developing economy antidumping cases pick out developing economy exporters to the same degree as do developed economy exporters.
ANTIDUMPING METHODOLOGY SINCE THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT
The surge of antidumping usage in the 1980s brought forward a wave of legal and economic analysis of antidumping methodology.
11 Antidumping arms protection-seeking interests with the emotionally compelling argument that foreigners are behaving unfairly. This work focused on two points: 1. The administrative methodology was biased -inclined to find dumping when a fair accounting even of pricing below cost would not. 2. The social justification -that antidumping extended to transactions from outside the national borders the same discipline that anti-trust law applied to internal transactions.
11 Boltuck-Litan (1991) and pulled together much of the criticism, both legal and economic.
The first criticisms came from legal analysis, e.g., Dickey (1979) .
The definitive analysis of the latter point was an extensive review by the OECD of antidumping cases in Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States. The review found that 90 percent of the instances of import sales found to be unfair under antidumping rules would never have been questioned under competition law, i.e., if used by a domestic enterprise in making a domestic sale. Much less than ten percent of the antidumping cases would have survived the much more rigorous standards of evidence that applies under competition law.
12
As this mass of criticism came forward, defenders of antidumping shifted to a more political argument, based on a sense of legitimacy -rules of the game -rather than efficiency. Some sources of seller advantage should not be allowed -e.g., subsidies, selling from a "sanctuary" or protected home market and other government-provided advantages -even if they did not result in consumers being harmed by restraints on competition.
13
Brink Lindsey of the Cato Institute has provided a damning analysis of these arguments. Lindsey reviewed 141 company-specific dumping determinations by the US Commerce Department, 1995-98, to ascertain the methods used by Commerce to identify the source of their findings of dumping, and to evaluate the compatibility of the actual determination of dumping with the rhetoric of what justified it. He investigates at two levels: 1. Are antidumping determinations as actually conducted effective methodologies to identify the pricing practices of price discrimination and selling below cost? 2. Are these pricing practices reliable indicators of the alleged market distortions that justify import restrictions?
In simpler words: ! Does the process bring forward the evidence it alleges? ! Does the evidence prove that the crime was committed?
The evidence Lindsey marshals soundly supports a negative answer to both questions.
On detecting discrimination between home market and export price -and hence a direct indication of selling from a sanctuary market -Lindsey points out that price comparisons are almost never made. Virtually all cases are based on artificial indicators of what the home market price might (or should) be. Lindsey's findings on this point are in Table 1 .
From here, Lindsay went on to investigate the impact of various adjustments the Commerce Department routinely makes to the price information provided by exporters. He did this -generally speaking 14 -by obtaining from exporters the complete information they had submitted to Commerce, then recalculated dumping margins from the entire data set, e.g., the data set including the sales that Commerce threw out as "below cost." 12 OECD Economics Department 1996, p. 18. The country studies were eventually published in Lawrence, 1998. 13 Lindsay 1999, pp. 2ff., provides a good discussion as well as quotations from and references to antidumping defenders. 14 See Lindsey for specifics.
Among the telling points Lindsey documents is the extent to which constructed cost methodology overstates profit rates. In no instance for which he found comparable data was the profit rated used in the Commerce calculation less than twice the actual rate of profit in the US industry. In no other instance was it less than three times as high. 15 He also documents an investigation in which the dumping margin is increased by a factor of three when Commerce screened out as "below cost" some of the prices on home-market sales supplied by the exporter, others in which there would have been no dumping margin without the adjustments.
As to the results of a dumping investigation supporting the conclusion of the exporter enjoying a sanctuary home market, the first point Lindsey makes is that such investigations hardly ever provide price comparisons. "Data" on selling below cost is based on questionable measures of cost, and even if it were accurate cost data, it does not demonstrate that the same low prices were available in the home market. 16 The evidence leaves much more than a reasonable doubt than the alleged sanctuary situation.
Lindsey adds supplementary evidence against the sanctuary allegation, e.g., 1. he finds no correlation between dumping margins and foreign tariff rates, 2. the US government's own "official" tabulation of foreign import restrictions 17 lists significant restrictions in only two of the instances he covered.
In sum, Lindsey's findings establish that the Uruguay Round Agreement did not change the nature of antidumping practice. The evidence against the exporter is mostly constructed (value). If the exporter does not supply data from which the investigating agency can perform the construction, the accusation from the companies seeking protection then becomes the evidence -the "facts available."
MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT ANTIDUMPING
Dealing sensibly with antidumping as trade policy requires first that it be dealt with for what it is -a wide-reaching instrument for restricting imports. Thus two of Washington's most skilled international trade lawyers begin their advise on how to deal with such instruments in the following way:
"From the perspective of a US industry seeking protection, [trade laws] simply represent different ways of reaching the same goal -improvement of the competitive position of the complainant against other companies. Exporters should disregard any moralistic claims associated with trade litigation ('dumping,' 'subsidies,' 'unfair' access to raw materials, cheap labor, etc.) and view it from the same perspective -how will the dispute affect their competitive position in the US market." (Horlick and Shea, 2000, p. 1) 15 Lindsey, 1999 ; Table 4 . 16 Lindsey, p. 10, documents instances where, had the cost comparison had been against variable cost there would have been no dumping margin -even using Commerce "cost" data. 17 The National Trade Estimates Report, issued annually by USTR.
Sensible as it sounds, this not the typical attitude. The following three incidents, drawn from the experiences of the authors of this paper, portray more typical views:
1. The chairperson, director of the local chamber of industries, opened a one-week seminar on antidumping by exhorting his colleagues on the benefits of integrating the local economy into the world economy, cajoled them against the dangers of their traditional protectionist sentiments, and urged them to pay attention to the possibilities offered by this modern, WTO-sanctioned instrument, antidumping.
2. A deputy minister of a small country descried his situation as follows:
"In our country, farmers grow chickens. If you want chicken for dinner, you go to the market and you buy a chicken.
In the United States, farmers do not grow chickens, they grow chicken parts. Because people in the United States are afraid of cholesterol, they prefer white meat, so it sells at a good price. The legs, the dark meat, they export to our country, at a price lower than what our farmers usually get for a chicken.
That's dumping, isn't it, so shouldn't we take action?" 3. Since 1990, an industrializing Asian country has conducted a number of antidumping investigations. Several of these investigations concerned imports of industrial inputs such as steel or chemicals. After receiving a petition from another such domestic industry, the country's international trade commission examined the petitions, found them to be complete and the information in them to be accurate. The government then imposed a preliminary antidumping duty.
User industries complained about the higher costs imposed on them, and eventually convinced the government that the jobs and output that would be lost by user industries exceeded what would be saved in the industry that had sought protection. The government then lifted the antidumping duty and closed the case.
This decision left the Commission in a quandary. The (preliminary) antidumping investigation that had proceeded by the letter of the WTO agreement, had come out affirmative; yet imposing an antidumping action did not seem to be the correct thing to do. The Commission called in several outside experts to help them to review their investigation procedures.
The point of these stories is that the WTO antidumping agreement is not economic advice. It is about when an import restriction is permitted, not about when one is recommended. Antidumping's rise to prominence had nothing to do with the logic of a sensible pressure valve instrument. The political struggle that shaped it was over more vs. less import restrictions, not over what makes for sensible economic policy.
The government in the third incident above made the correct decision, the decision that took into account the impact of an import restriction on all domestic interests. Yet the government was uncomfortable with its decision, both because it was not one dictated by GATT/WTO rules, and because following GATT/WTO rules had not convinced the domestic users to accept the hardship an import restriction imposed on them.
A BETTER SAFEGUARD MECHANISM
The key issue is the impact on the local economy. Who in the local economy would benefit from the proposed import restriction, and who would lose? On each side, by how much? It is therefore critical that the policy process by which the government decides to intervene or not to intervene gives voice to those interests that benefit from open trade and would bear the costs of the proposed intervention. Such a policy mechanism would both (a) help the government to separate trade interventions that would serve the national economic interest from those that would not, and (b) even in those instances in which the decision is to restrict imports, support the politics of openness and liberalization.
Antidumping fails to satisfy either criteria. As economics, it looks at only half of the economic impact on the domestic economy. It gives standing to import competing domestic interests, but not to domestic users, be they user enterprises or consumers. As politics, it undercuts rather than supports a policy of openness; by giving voice to only the negative impact of trade on domestic interests and by inviting such interests to blame their problems on the "unfairness" of foreigners.
The key characteristic of a sensible safeguard procedure is that it treats domestic interests that would be harmed by an import restriction, equally with those domestic interests that would benefit. The "morality" of the foreign interest is irrelevant -the issue is the plus and minus on the domestic economy. Operationally, this suggestion means simply that what is done in an "injury test," -identification of impact on import competing interests -is repeated for users of imports. The mechanics involve the same variables; impacts on profits, output, employment, etc. and the same techniques to quantify them.
CONCLUSION
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